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This study deals with credit risk modelling and stress testing within the context of a 
Merton-type one-factor model. We analyse the corporate and household sectors of the 
Czech Republic and Germany to find determining variables of credit risk in both 
countries. We find that a set of similar variables explains corporate credit risk in both 
countries despite substantial differences in the default rate pattern. This does not 
apply to households, where further research seems to be necessary. Next, we establish 
a framework for the stress testing of credit risk. We use a country specific stress 
scenario that shocks macroeconomic variables with medium severity. The test results 
in credit risk increasing by more than 100% in the Czech Republic and by roughly 
40% in Germany.  The two outcomes are not fully comparable since the shocks are 
calibrated according to the historical development of the time series considered and 





JEL Codes:   G21, G28, G33.  
Keywords:  Credit risk, credit risk modelling, stress testing. 
 
 
                                                           
* Petr Jakubík, Czech National Bank and Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University in Prague (e-mail: 
Petr.Jakubik@cnb.cz);  
Christian Schmieder, Deutsche Bundesbank and European Investment Bank (e-mail:C.Schmieder@eib.org). 
This work was supported by Czech National Bank Research Project No. C2/07. 
The data analysis for this paper was generated using Base SAS and SAS/STAT software, Version 9.1.3. of 
the SAS System for Windows. Copyright © 2002-2003 SAS Institute Inc. SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. 
product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA. 
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and do not 
represent the views of any of the authors’ institutions. We thank Miroslav Singer, Michal Hlaváček, Vladimír 
Pikora, Jan Frait, Kateřina Šmídková, Thilo Liebig, Christoph Memmel and Pierre Tychon for their valuable 
comments and support. The financial support provided for this project by the Czech National Bank is gratefully 
acknowledged.  2   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
Nontechnical Summary 
This study deals with two major aspects of credit risk, namely its measurement and management. 
We seek to measure credit risk on the ‘macro’ level by investigating the two major elements of 
non-bank credit in economies: corporate credit and household credit. For that purpose, we use a 
relatively simple credit model whereby credit losses can be explained by the development of key 
macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth and inflation. Accordingly, we estimate separate 
models for corporate credit and household credit. Next, we make use of these models to predict 
potential future levels of credit losses for firms and households, commonly known as stress 
testing. The outcome of these forecasts on a macro level is then used for predicting a stress 
scenario of a typical bank credit portfolio. In this way, the study takes a comprehensive view of 
credit risk. 
The analysis is carried out for two countries, Germany and the Czech Republic. The application of 
the method to two countries is the key contribution of this study. The main questions are as 
follows.  
¾  Which factors are the most important macroeconomic drivers of credit risk? 
¾  Are they the same for the two (very different) economies?  
¾  How vulnerable are these two economies and banks in economic stress periods?  
Why are these questions relevant? The recent financial crisis originated mainly from severe 
problems in the US household credit sector (the so-called US subprime crisis). It adds one more 
chapter to the history of past financial crises which have been caused primarily by an 
accumulation of non-bank credit losses, be it corporate or household debt. It is striking that 
despite the awareness that credit risk is the most important threat to financial stability, the 
complexity of this risk type is so high that crisis prevention remains a key challenge for the future. 
This results particularly from the increasing complexity of financial markets and their 
international dimensions, which requires worldwide cooperation. 
This is the purpose of this study, namely to add insights to the important subject of financial 
stability. It thus contributes to the recent recommendations issued in April 2008 by a key 
international forum for fostering financial stability, the Financial Stability Forum, which 
recommends a strengthening of authorities’ responsiveness to risks and an improvement of stress-
testing practices and capital planning processes by banks.  
We use a common indicator to explain credit risk, namely non-performing loans. We find that our 
model is useful for explaining credit risk for firm debt and that similar macroeconomic variables 
explain the corporate default rates of the Czech Republic and Germany. Given their different 
cyclical patterns, this is a surprising outcome. For household debt, our model is less useful for 
both countries, which leaves some challenges for future research.  
Afterwards, we assess how future recessions could influence corporate credit and household credit 
losses by referring to historical stress scenarios. We use the macroeconomic situation at the end of 
2006 and predict an economic downturn for 2007 for both countries. We use stress levels of 
similar severity for both countries from a historical perspective, including the last decade, and find 
that even relatively light stress can lead to a substantial increase in the corporate default rate Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   3 
 
(more than 100% for the Czech Republic; up to 40% for Germany). As a caveat, the sensitivity of 
the corporate sector default rates for the Czech Republic was driven by the high volatility of 
macroeconomic indicators during the transition period of the late 1990s, so the results have to be 
interpreted carefully. For households, sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment is less 
pronounced, unlike what the recent US subprime crisis might suggest, and seems to confirm the 
observation that the financial crisis has not had a considerable effect on the Czech and German 
household sector so far. 
In the last step, the stress scenarios for the economies are applied to a hypothetical, but realistic 
average credit portfolio that could be held by a Czech or German bank. The credit risk models for 
both countries employ similar variables and the size of the shocks is calibrated according to the 
past development of the given time series. It is clearly shown that macroeconomic shocks can 
significantly increase the portfolio risk measured by the Basel II regulatory IRB minimum capital 
requirements in both countries.  
The methods and procedure presented in this study can be used by regulatory bodies to be able to 
take measures to safeguard financial stability. For banks, the framework elaborated may 
contribute to the introduction of Basel II-type micro stress testing. In any case, future research is 
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1. Introduction 
In quantitative terms, credit risk is the most important risk in banking books. This has recently 
been shown clearly again in the US subprime crisis. Moreover, the crisis occurred despite various 
improvements in credit risk management, for example progress in the field of credit risk analysis 
applied by banks on the portfolio level – spurred by Basel II
1 – as well as the increasing 
availability of a wide range of instruments that make credit risk more liquid, for example 
securitisation and credit derivatives. Hence, credit risk remains a major threat to financial stability 
in the globalised financial world, where cross-border contagion of crises particularly threatens 
countries with weak banking sectors. 
Credit risk analysis for the financial sector as a whole can be seen as a crucial means of 
preventing financial instability. This can be realised by means of a regular robustness test on a 
country’s banking sector against credit risk, for example by means of stress tests carried out by 
supervisory bodies and central banks, providing hints for detecting financial system fragility.
2  
Within the framework of credit risk modelling and stress testing, this study investigates and 
compares two countries, a new EU member state – the Czech Republic – and the largest EU 
economy – Germany. We seek to provide answers to various questions, notably: which 
macroeconomic variables are the most important for explaining credit risk; whether there are 
country-specific differences; and what impact unfavourable macroeconomic circumstances can 
have on the macro and micro (portfolio) level.  
The data employed in this study cover a period of eight years from 1998 to 2006 for the Czech 
Republic and twelve years from 1994 to 2006 for Germany. The investigated time period covers 
multiple periods of severe macroeconomic stress, namely the consequences of the Asian crisis in 
1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998, as well as the crisis in the financial markets after 
11 September 2001.  
When it comes to credit risk analysis for the Central and Eastern European transition economies 
(and also for many other transformation economies and developing countries), a key limitation is 
the availability of data, as the time series are usually (still) relatively short and have various 
structural breaks. Accordingly, the data in this study were selected very carefully to prevent 
misinterpretation.
3 In order to arrive at a meaningful comparison between the Czech Republic and 
Germany, equivalent data was sought. 
We investigate both the corporate sector and the household sector and find that credit risk for 
corporates can be modelled based on similar macroeconomic variables for both countries, despite 
fundamental differences in the default rate (time) pattern. Credit risk modelling for the household 
sector turns out to be more challenging for both countries, as there are apparently other variables 
than solely economic ones explaining the default rate pattern. These findings do, in general, 
confirm previous studies. 
                                                           
1 See BCBS (2006), European Commission (2006) and the national transpositions of Basel II. 
2 The importance of this mission is underlined, for example, by the fact that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has mandated a working group of the Research Task Force to further investigate stress testing. 
3 We draw on the findings of the analysis carried out by Jakubík (2007a and 2007b). Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   5 
 
In the second step, we use the outcome of our credit risk modelling for macro stress testing 
purposes. In the third step, we translate the outcome of the macro stress tests into a Basel II-type 
micro stress test of a hypothetical, but realistic, credit portfolio. We find that the impact of the 
macroeconomic shocks we study is substantially higher in the Czech Republic than in Germany, 
on both the macro and micro levels. For a stress test of medium severity, we find an increase in 
aggregate corporate default rates of more than 100% and a rise in the Basel II internal ratings-
based (IRB
4) minimum capital requirements on the credit portfolio level of up to 60% in the 
Czech case within one year. The figures for Germany are an increase in corporate default rates of 
40% and an augmentation of the IRB minimum capital requirements of roughly 30% for the same 
credit portfolio. For the household sectors of both countries, the impact is much less pronounced 
compared to corporates, with a higher impact in the German case, but the outcome is less robust 
and therefore has to be interpreted carefully.  
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold: first, we provide a comprehensive framework for 
stress testing; second, we directly compare a new EU member state with one of the large “old” EU 
economies. While there is no directly comparable study in the literature, we confirm the finding of 
previous studies that stress events have a more material effect in less developed economies.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related studies. Section 3 
describes the model used to analyse credit risk for the corporate and household sectors. In Section 
4, the underlying data are presented. Next, the corporate and household models are calibrated for 
the Czech Republic and Germany in sections 5 and 6 respectively. Section 7 is devoted to stress 
testing. Finally, section 8 provides conclusions. 
2. Related Literature 
A key motivation for this study originates from the Basel II framework, concluded in 2006, which 
seeks to provide a more meaningful framework for the solvency of financial institutions and 
financial stability compared to the previous Basel Accord dating back to 1988.
5 Within this 
framework, our focus is on the investigation of business cycle effects on the aggregate default rate 
of corporates and households and the link to banks’ capital requirements. 
Various studies have been carried out in this domain. On the micro level, a comprehensive survey 
of the literature dealing with cyclical effects on the major credit risk parameters, namely the 
probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and the exposure at default (EAD), has been 
provided by Allen and Saunders (2004). Accordingly, all three credit risk parameters are found to 
be highly exposed to cyclical effects, implying a considerable impact on portfolio credit risk and 
capital requirements.
6 In a recent study carried out by Düllmann et al. (2008), this has also been 
demonstrated to hold true for credit correlations. 
                                                           
4 Credit Portfolio Risk in this study is measured based on the Basel II minimum capital requirements, which 
closely resemble the Credit Value-at-Risk figures. We refer to the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach – see 
BCBS (2006), para. 272.  
5 Another important catalyst for stress testing was the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank initiated in the late 1990s. 
6 The study by Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003), for example, was an early one to show that the choice of a Point-
in-Time (PIT) rating system can evoke procyclicality of capital requirements, whereas Through-the-Cycle (TTC) 
rating systems are more neutral. Through a comparison of PIT rating systems and TTC systems, Löffler (2004) 6   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
 While most of the numerous studies on the cyclicality of portfolio credit risk have been carried 
out for developed countries, the outcome that capital requirements vary strongly with the 
economic cycle and are driven by a complex interaction of different credit risk parameters does 
also hold true for developing countries, although pertinent empirical evidence remains more 
limited to date. Vallés (2006), for example, finds that the implementation of a through-the-cycle 
(TTC) rating system in emerging countries would be very difficult due to the high volatility of 
credit risk, indicating that portfolio credit risk might fluctuate even more strongly than in the 
developed world. 
Despite the numerous contributions on how credit risk parameters fluctuate over the business 
cycle, stress testing of (real) credit portfolios remains relatively limited to date, particularly due to 
the limited data that is publicly available. Among the few contributions are Peura and Jokivuolle 
(2004) and Rösch and Scheule (2007).  
There is a wide range of research on the macroeconomic perspective of credit risk. The seminal 
question is how to model the aggregated credit risk of an economy or specific sectors such as 
corporates and households. Various approaches have been followed in the literature, such as 
applying econometric analysis on a firm-specific level including macroeconomic variables (Bunn 
and Redwood 2003) and using multi-factor credit portfolio models. A seminal model in the latter 
context was proposed by Wilson (1997a, 1997b), known as Credit Portfolio View
TM, which has 
been used for macro stress testing by Virolainen (2004), for example. In terms of the dependent 
variable, macro stress tests have typically been analysed based on loan loss provisions (LLPs) or 
non-performing loans (NPLs). A recent review of different modelling methodologies has been 
provided by Sorge and Virolainen (2006). 
Various macroeconomic variables have been found to be relevant as drivers of credit risk, the 
main drivers for corporate credit risk being GDP growth and interest rates (Virolainen, 2004). 
Other relevant variables were corporate indebtedness, inflation, industrial production, real wages, 
the stock index and the oil price (Virolainen, 2004). For the household sector, empirical evidence 
is more limited, with unemployment and interest rates being among the most relevant variables 
referred to. 
Stress testing is commonly used by central banks and regulatory bodies to identify vulnerabilities 
of the financial sector overall or to determine specific risks for individual institutions.
7 This can 
generally be realised in a top-down manner or by referring to a bottom-up framework.
8 Sorge and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
finds that the differences are mainly driven by cyclical components of default risk. Bangia et al. (2002) and 
Trück and Rachev (2005), for example, have shown that there is a substantial impact of default probabilities and 
rating transitions on portfolio credit risk. 
7 Macro stress tests are also carried out by the regulatory bodies of the two countries analysed in this study, the 
Czech National Bank and the Deutsche Bundesbank. In the Czech case, the stress testing framework has been 
gradually elaborated since 2004 by Čihák (2004) and Čihák et al. (2007). Based on a forecast of the 
macroeconomic environment in terms of historical worst-case scenarios, credit risk models as developed by 
Jakubík (2007) are applied. The Deutsche Bundesbank takes a two-step approach: besides using aggregate data 
available in the central bank to analyse financial stability (top-down approach), it also uses information collected 
from single institutions via a survey (bottom-up approach) (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). In the first case, which 
is similar to the current study, the Bundesbank uses a macro module to define macroeconomic stress events via 
macroeconomic variables, which are then fed into a microeconomic module (the so-called banking module) to 
assess which banks would run into difficulties (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p. 106f.).  
8 For an overview of stress tests applied by German banks, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) and Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2007).  Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   7 
 
Virolainen (2006) provide a literature overview of analytical approaches to macro stress tests and 
apply these models to the case of Finland (see also Jones et al., 2004, and Sorge, 2004). Boss et al. 
(2006) give an overview of the stress testing framework followed by the Austrian central bank. 
The rationale is to explain industry-specific default rates by means of macroeconomic risk factor 
changes in order to be able to apply industry sector-specific stress tests. Credit risk models with 
macroeconomic variables are also employed in stress test exercises carried out by the Bank of 
England. Within this framework, Pain (2003) found an empirical relationship between banks’ loan 
loss provisions and macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth, real interest rates, credit 
growth and the concentration of the domestic loan portfolio. For the new EU member states, 
studies remain more limited. Overall, previous studies find that a relatively limited number of 
macroeconomic factors permit credit risk for the corporate sector to be explained in a meaningful 
way, including at times of financial turbulence.
9  
3 Credit Risk Modelling with Macroeconomic Variables 
In this study, we refer to the loaded one-factor credit risk model, which is also the basis for 
calculating the Basel II capital requirements for credit risk (Gordy, 2003). To explain credit risk, 
the idea is to model the aggregated credit risk conditional on the macroeconomic environment, 
whereby the model becomes a quasi multi-factor model while keeping its conceptual simplicity. 
The one-factor model has been employed for credit risk modelling by several authors, for example 
Hamerle et al. (2004), Rösch (2005) and Jakubík (2007). Unlike linear models, this relatively 
simple non-linear model better captures the highly complex relationships of economies, which are 
hardly linear in the real world. Subsequently, the basic cornerstones of the model and the ways it 
will be used for credit risk modelling are outlined.  
A random variable with a standard normal distribution is assumed for the standardised logarithmic 
asset returns of firm i at time t: 
 
it t it U F R ρ ρ − + = 1  (1) 
where R it denotes the logarithmic asset return for each firm i of an economy at time t, and Ft 
corresponds to the logarithmic asset return of the economy at time t, which is assumed to be a 
random variable with a standard normal distribution. This variable represents the part of the asset 
return which is not firm-specific and can thus denote the general economic conditions for the 
profitability and creditworthiness of firms in the economy. Uit denotes the firm-specific asset 
return, which is again assumed to be random with a standard normal distribution. The two random 
variables are assumed to be serially independent. The portion of risk that is systematic is defined 
by i ρ , the correlation of the firm’s asset return with the systematic factor Ft. 
Given these assumptions, the logarithmic asset return of firm i at time t is also standard normally 
distributed. The model is based on the Merton model, according to which a default occurs if the 
return on a firm’s assets falls below a certain barrier T, the default threshold. Formally, 
) ( ) 1 ( T R P Y P it it < = = , (2) 
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where Y denotes a binary random variable with two potential states, borrower i defaults (1), or 
does not default (0), at time t and T is the default threshold.  
In order to model aggregate credit risk by means of different macroeconomic indicators, it is 
further assumed – unlike in the case of Gordy’s Basel II one-factor-model (Gordy, 2003) – that 
the value of the default threshold T depends on the economic cycle. This is modelled by taking a 
linear combination of macroeconomic variables (xjt) to represent the value of the default threshold 
T. 
The final form of the macroeconomic one-factor credit risk model used in this study is shown in 
equation (3), where Ψ denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution that 
represents the impact of changes in the macroeconomic indicators, β0 is a constant and βj are the 
coefficients of the macroeconomic variables, xjt:  
∑ ∑
= =
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The default probability conditional on the realisation Ft of a random unobservable factor 
representing the state of the economy at time t corresponding to the default probability (3) is given 
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If we furthermore assume a homogeneous portfolio of firms in the economy whose asset returns 
follow process (1), the default rate in the economy is – based on the law of large numbers – 
equivalent to the firm’s default probabilities. Accordingly, the model may then be applied to 
homogeneous sub-sectors of the economy such as the corporate sector and the household sector.  
Accordingly, the specification of the model resulting from (3) is as follows: 
 
) ( ∑ + =
i
i i t x c df β ψ  (5) 
 
where dft denotes the dependent variable of the model (i.e. the default rate based on NPL inflows), 
β  is the coefficient vector, x is the vector of the macroeconomic variables and c is a constant.  
Due to recalculation by the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution, the 
coefficients of equation (5) cannot be interpreted as the commonly used elasticities of the impacts Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   9 
 
of the relevant macroeconomic factors on credit risk. Rather, the joint effect of a change in a 
different dimension is measured.
10  
In order to estimate model (3), a relationship with a conditional number of defaults of firms 
depending on the realisation of random variable F, the latent factor f t is used. This number is, 
under the given assumptions, again random and has a binomial distribution with the conditional 
probability pi(ft) given by equation (4) and the number of firms Nt. 
)) ( , ( ) ( t t t f p N Bi f D ≈  (6) 
The model is then calibrated by maximising a likelihood function. To ensure that it is robust, and 
in particular to avoid calibration bias, the residuals obtained are tested for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity.  
4. Data 
Next, the composition of the dependent variable, the inflow of non-performing loans
11 (NPLs), 
and the macroeconomic indicators will be outlined for both the Czech Republic and Germany. 
The data are generally annual observations derived from one-year sliding windows on quarterly 
data.  
4.1 Data for the Czech Republic 
In the case of the Czech Republic, the inflow of the NPLs was not separately available for the 
household and corporate sectors. Moreover, the original raw data taken from the Czech National 
Bank (CNB, 2007) were quarterly sectoral NPL stocks. In order to obtain sectoral NPL flows, the 
NPL stocks were adjusted for write-offs, sales and the enforcement of such exposures in the 
banks’ books. Accordingly, the total annual NPL flows were split into corporate, household and 
other credit. This was done based on expert judgment, facilitated by robustness checks based on 
credit register data, where the actual monthly data have been available since November 2002. 
Finally, the annual NPL flows (henceforth also default rates) used as the dependent variable of 
this study were calculated. 
The relatively volatile time patterns of the corporate and household default rates for the Czech 
Republic are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 3 respectively.  
The macroeconomic data for the Czech Republic were taken from the time series archives 
(ARAD) of the Czech National Bank. Similarly to the existing literature (see section 2), we 
considered the annual growth rate of real GDP of the Czech economy and its most important trade 
partner economies (Germany, EU-12, EU-15, EU-25), the level of real exchange rates, nominal 
                                                           
10 For this reason, we cannot calculate the elasticities of the macroeconomic factors employed by the final 
specification of the model. The impact of these indicators on the sectoral default probability can only be 
evaluated conditional upon the other factors. By consequence, the effect of the change of the selected factor is 
different according to the level of the other macroeconomic indicators incorporated into the model. 
11 In fact, we first calculated the inflow of NPLs on a quarterly basis. Second, we derived the annual default rate 
by dividing the sum of the quarterly NPL inflows by the average volume of outstanding loans during the relevant 
one-year sliding window. As already outlined in the literature review, bankruptcy data-based insolvency rates 
could also be used as the dependent variable. This approach was used, for example, by Virolainen (2004) and 
Boss et al. (2006). 10   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
and real interest rates (PRIBOR1M, PRIBOR3M, PRIBOR6M, PRIBOR1Y
12), inflation, the 
unemployment rate and the ratio of corporate loans to GDP for the corporate model. For the level 
of real exchange rates, nominal and real interest rates and inflation we used seasonally adjusted 
data.
13 Descriptive statistics on the macroeconomic variables included in the final corporate model 
for the Czech Republic are shown below.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Macroeconomic Variables for the Czech Republic 
Variable  Notation  Mean  StD(%)  Min   Max 
Real Exchange Rate  E  0.934 0.07 0.805  1.046 
Inflation (%)  π  2.70 2.44 -0.40  12.00 
Nominal Interest Rate (%)
14  ir  2.87 2.64 1.75  13.90 
Real GDP Growth (%)  gdp  3.59 1.89 -0.38  6.66 
Industrial Production (%)  indprod  5.85 5.41 -8.80  13.60 
Corporate Credit to GDP (%)  debt  23.82 11.99 16.51  50.24 
 
For the household model, the unemployment rate, nominal and real interest rates, inflation, the 
interest rate gap, the real GDP growth rate, the output gap, the ratio of loans to GDP, and the ratio 
of interest paid to income or disposable income were considered for the specification of the 
model.
15 
The macroeconomic variables for the corporate model were available from 1998 Q3 and thus 
shorter than the dependent variable, so the model was estimated for the time period from 1998 Q3 
to 2006 Q4 (see Table 3). For the household sector, the dataset used for the calibration of the 
model spans the period from 1997 Q3 to 2006 Q4 (see Table 3). 
4.2 Data for Germany 
For the German economy, the availability of data is, in general, more favourable than for the 
Czech Republic, although the time series have been impacted by German re-unification and by the 
introduction of the euro. However, data for the dependent variable, NPLs, were available only 
fairly recently for regulatory purposes, spurred by the stress testing framework of the IMF and the 
World Bank, and thus not accessible to the public. Overall, the rationale for the German case was 
to attempt at referring to analogous variables as in the Czech case, in order to enable a meaningful 
comparison. 
The NPL inflows for the German economy used in this study are based on the data reported to the 
Deutsche Bundesbank in the framework of regulatory reporting since 1994.
16 In order to arrive at 
quarterly data, the annual amounts were interpolated and then divided by the sum of the corporate 
                                                           
12 PRIBOR denotes Prague InterBank Offered Rate; 1M denotes one month, 3M three months, 6M six months 
and 1Y one year. 
13 i.e. deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) and the production price index (PPI). 
14 PRIBOR1M is reported in Table 1.  
15 Disposable income was modelled using average wages and household consumption. Interest paid was 
modelled as the product of the credit volume and the annual PRIBOR plus a specific interest rate spread paid by 
households according to CNB data. 
16 These data were compiled from the figures reported by the German banks in the framework of banking 
supervision and are not publicly available.  Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   11 
 
and household credit volumes for the given quarter.
17 The NPLs were again not available 
separately for corporates and households. The disaggregation was realised as follows: first, the 
shares of household and corporate credit in the total non-bank credit volume in Germany for the 
relevant quarter were taken.
18 Next, these shares were combined with the insolvency rate
19 to 
disentangle the ratio into corporate and household NPLs. In this way, the quarterly NPLs for 
German corporates and households were available for the period from 1994 to 2006.
20  
The NPLs for German corporate loans remain approximately on the same level during the 1990s, 
then there is a steady increase until 2002 and a substantial and continuous decrease afterwards 
(Figure 2). For the NPLs of household credit, we observe a steady increase over the whole 
observation period.
21 This is reflected in a rapid and continuous increase in the insolvency rates 
for households, although the default level remains relatively low.
22 
The macroeconomic data for Germany were taken from the time series archives of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and Eurostat.
23 For corporates, various indicators were taken into account, namely 
the level of nominal interest rates
24, real GDP growth, the change in the real effective exchange 
rate
25, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, the development of industrial production, the 
inflow of order bookings in industry and the corporate credit
26 to GDP ratio. Like in the Czech 
case, we generally used annualised quarterly data that have been adjusted for seasonality.
27 
Descriptive statistics on the macroeconomic variables included in the final model for Germany are 
shown below.  
 
                                                           
17 This was done by taking the reported NPLs for the relevant period as the reference value for the second 
quarter. Subsequently, the figures for the other periods were interpolated and extrapolated for the data in the first 
and last year respectively. 
18 Corporate debt is thus referred to both as corporate debt and the debt of self-employed persons, amounting to 
37% and 17% respectively of the total debt to non-banks in 2007.  
19 Given that the insolvency rate for the household sector is only available since its introduction in 1999, the 
insolvency rate of 1999 was also used for 1994 to 1998. The generally very low level of household insolvencies 
at this time can justify this approach. For the period after 1999, the annual insolvencies recorded by 
CreditReform were referred to and were subsequently interpolated to arrive at quarterly data. For the corporate 
sector, annualised quarterly insolvency rates recorded by the German statistical office were used.  
20 In the same way as for the Czech Republic, the NPL inflows were adjusted for the public sector and 
entrepreneurs. 
21 A private insolvency code was only introduced in 1999. One of the reasons for the increase in the private 
default rate may also have been that this opportunity was only gradually “discovered” by the population. 
22 The relatively low level of household default rates for Germany reflects the very benign economic 
development of the German economy after the Second World War, at least until German re-unification, as well 
as the economic model followed, namely the social market economy (“Soziale Marktwirtschaft”). This economic 
model has brought forward a very solid middle-class population participating in growth and a comparably minor 
low social class, further facilitated by a low level of unemployment and a strong role of social systems. Given 
that the market for securitisation in Germany is relatively limited, it can also be ruled out that household defaults 
were “hidden” in the securitisation data and thus not captured in the credit register data.  
23 We took the GDP values from the Eurostat archive and the remaining time series from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank.  
24 Until 1999, we used one-month annual German interbank rates and afterwards we used one-month annual 
EURIBOR rates.  
25 We used the real effective exchange rate with the EER-44 group. 
26 We referred to the amount lent to non-banks as reported in the monthly report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
27 For data of monthly frequency we referred to the mean value in the relevant quarter. 12   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Macroeconomic Variables for Germany 
Variable  Notation  Mean  StD(%)  Min  Max 
Real Exchange Rate  E  0.978 0.07 0.818  1.073 
Inflation (%)  π  1.60 0.59 0.20 3.17 
Nominal Interest Rate (%)  ir  4.49 2.14 2.08 9.70 
Real GDP Growth (%)  gdp  1.72 1.65 -1.96 7.69 
Industrial Production (%)  indprod  1.30 3.54 -8.89 6.95 
Corporate Credit to GDP  debt  56.64 3.19 51.49  62.01 
 
For the household sector, five indicators were considered in particular, namely the unemployment 
rate, the nominal and real interest rate (EURIBOR), the household credit to GDP ratio, net 
household income in nominal terms and the household savings rate. 
The table below provides an overview of the time span of the data available for the two models 
and two country specifications. As shown in the table, the time series for Germany date back three 
to four years longer than in the Czech case. 
Table 3: Overview of the Time Series Available to Calibrate the Model per Sector and Country 








Timeframe  1997 Q3 – 
2006 Q4 
1998 Q3 – 
2006 Q4 
1994 Q1 – 
2006 Q4 
1994 Q1 – 
2006 Q4 
5 A Credit Risk Model for the Corporate Sector  
The key macroeconomic determinants used to explain the development of the corporate default 
rate in an economy are, among others, (real) interest rates (1), exchange rates (2), inflation (3), the 
state of the economy and that of key business partners, denoted by the growth rate (4), as well as 
the level of corporate indebtedness (5).
28 For both countries, at least one variable from each 
“domain” was considered.  
After testing various specifications based on expert judgment, namely by seeking to include at 
least one variable from all five domains discussed above and by considering meaningful time lags, 
we arrived at country-specific models being most useful to depict the historic default rates. The 
inclusion of as few variables as possible facilitates stress testing, which will be performed in the 
next step. For both countries, the model contains four variables, two of which are the same for 
both countries with the same time lags as shown in Table . 
For the Czech Republic, the model comprises the real exchange rate (e), inflation (π), GDP (gdp), 
and the indebtedness of the corporate sector as a proportion of gdp (debt), with the time lags as 
shown below: 
) ( 4 5 1 , 4 1 3 2 2 − − − + + + + = t t t t t debt gdp e c df β β π β β ψ  (7) 
                                                           
28 Other relevant factors include the legal environment of a country, and particularly also forward-looking factors 
such as the slope of the yield curve and stock indices. Key macroeconomic determinants of the profitability of 
non-financial firms are discussed in CNB (2007), for example. Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   13 
 
In order to take into account that the time period considered constitutes a transition period for the 
Czech economy, we also explicitly controlled for potential structural breaks. This was done by 
recursively running the model and consecutively including longer time periods in the estimation. 
Accordingly, we analysed whether the coefficients were stable. The outcome is shown in the 
Appendix, including two standard error bands around the estimated coefficients. As shown in the 
graph, the coefficients exhibit relatively high instability by the end of 2003 and beginning of 
2004, which points to the presence of a structural break at that time.
29 To further trace this 
observation, we added a dummy variable to the model, defined as 1 for the first period and 0 
otherwise (see formula 8 below). It could be shown that the dummy variable was highly 
significant and the performance of the model increased when we chose the first period until the 
third quarter of 2003.
30  
As further elaborated below, in terms of the impact of these findings on the results, we found that 
the sensitivity of the corporate credit model for the Czech Republic to macroeconomic changes is 
lower since 2003, as the Czech economy had moved towards being a low risk post-transition 
economy by that time. One reason for that is that inefficient firms increasingly did not survive as 
the economy matured. Besides, the structural break was driven by bank privatisations that resulted 
in a restructuring of banks’ internal processes, especially lending.  
 
) ( 6 4 5 1 , 4 1 3 2 2 t t t t t t dum debt gdp e c df β β β π β β ψ + + + + + = − − −  (8) 
For Germany, the final model looks as follows: 
) ( 4 5 3 2 , 4 1 , 4 1 1 − − − + + + + = t t t t t debt indprod gdp ir c df β β β β ψ  (9) 
The German model comprises the nominal interest rate (ir), GDP (gdp), industrial production 
(indprod) and the debt to GDP ratio (debt). It is striking that the lag for the two variables included 
in both models, GDP and the debt ratio, turned out to be the same.  
The table below summarises the variables included, with the coefficients, the time lag, the 
significance level and the standard error.  
                                                           
29 This was confirmed by Chow tests, which rejected the hypothesis of no structural break at a confidence level 
of less than 1%.  
30 No further structural break was identified. This was confirmed by additional Chow tests. 14   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
Table 4: Macroeconomic Credit Risk Model for Czech and German Corporates 
Variable Notation  Czech  case  German  case 
   Lag  Coefficient  Std. 
error 
Lag Coefficient Std.   
Error 
Constant     -3.060***  0.358    -2.6997***  0.07141 
Nominal Interest Rate 
(β1) 
ir   ---    -1  2.2194***  0.4919 
Real Exchange Rate 
(β2) 
e  -2 1.062***  0.323    ---   
Inflation (β3)  π  -1 -4.850***  0.636    ---   
GDP (β4,1)  gdp   -4.609***  1.079  0  -3.3677***  0.3280 
Industrial Production 
(β4,2) 
indprod   ---    -3  -0.8215***  0.1464 
Credit-to-GDP Ratio 
(β5) 
debt  -4 3.006***  0.246  -4  1.0871***  0.1213 
Dummy Variable (β6)  dum   0.238***  0.043  0  0.0400***  0.0125 
Note: Significance level: **: Significant at 5% level; ***: Significant at 1% level.  
 
As shown in the table, the outcome of our empirical analysis demonstrates a substantial influence 
of the real exchange rate on corporate credit risk in the Czech Republic. This effect is in line with 
our expectations, as it particularly applies to export-oriented countries.
31 We used the real 
effective exchange rates of the Czech koruna deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) lagged 
by two quarters. The sign of the coefficients indicates, as expected, that a stronger real exchange 
rate of the domestic currency affects corporate credit risk positively, i.e. the default rate increases 
with appreciation of the koruna.  
The negative impact of inflation
32 on firms’ default rate, being less evident than the effect of other 
variables, was also confirmed. The reasoning for this is as follows. While companies can also be 
negatively affected by the increase in the prices of their inputs, an increase in the market prices of 
firms’ outputs will, by contrast, affect firms in the opposite way. From a debtor point of view, the 
increase in the price level in the economy corresponds to a decrease of the real value of a credit 
obligation. Although permanent inflation leads to additional costs and harms the economy, 
inflation tends to improve the financial situation of debtors in the short run and ceteris paribus 
leads to a decrease of companies’ default rates.  
An economic boom will definitely influence default rates in the corporate sector as the demand 
for goods and services produced by non-financial firms increases. Consequently, the profit of 
companies increases and corporate default rates decrease. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the 
                                                           
31 The reason is as follows. An appreciated exchange rate raises the prices of domestic goods in foreign currency 
so that firms become less competitive outside the country of origin. Given that, in general, the price of goods in 
foreign currency in the world market is highly determined by the cost/profit ratio of firms, appreciated exchange 
rates ultimately tend to result in higher default rates in the corporate sector. This effect can be assumed to be 
substantially higher for Czech firms than for German firms, the main reason being that German firms benefit in 
this context from the “domestic” euro area, where most of the German exports are located. The negative 
correlation for the Czech Republic has been empirically found by CNB (2007), for example. 
32 As given by the 4-quarter change in the consumer price index (CPI).  Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   15 
 
outcome of the regression shows that the corporate default rate in the Czech economy depends 
negatively on the growth rate of real GDP
33 over the previous year.  
The vulnerability of the corporate sector would be expected to depend on the extent of its 
indebtedness. The size of the effect would be expected to depend on how much higher financial 
leverage increases default probabilities, which will particularly occur in the case of an unexpected 
macroeconomic shock, denoted by the corporate debt to GDP ratio (credit-to-GDP). As regards 
this indicator, we found that a lag of four quarters turned out to be the best specification, with a 
positive effect on the corporate default rate.
34 
Moreover, it turned out that neither real and nominal interest rates, nor the real GDP growth rate 
in the EU-15, EU-25, EA-12 and Germany, nor the unemployment rate were among the most 
important explanatory variables. Although some of them had significant univariate prediction 
power for the corporate default rate, they did not contribute to the prediction power of the 
multivariate model in a meaningful way, as they were correlated with other variables included in 
the model specification. This applies particularly to nominal interest rates, which were not 
included in the Czech model as expected due to the correlation with the exchange rates. 
For Germany, the nominal interest rate
35 is found to be a key macroeconomic variable.
36 There 
are several reasons for that, one notably being that traditional long-term financing via bank debt 
plays an important role in the German economy. This particularly applies to German SMEs (the 
“Mittelstand”), which often have a close relationship with one or a small number of house 
bank(s). An increase in interest rates results in a prompt increase in the funding rates of corporates 
and thus to a worsening of firms’ ability to meet their financial obligations due to more expensive 
financial resources. Unlike in the case of the Czech Republic, neither the real exchange rate nor 
the inflation rate was among the most significant variables. In the first case, the introduction of the 
euro seems to have made an important contribution to reducing foreign exchange rate dependency 
for German firms. Similarly, given that economic growth in Germany was relatively low during 
the period considered, inflation was generally relatively low and thus not significant.  
In the same way as for the Czech Republic, the unlagged real GDP growth rate significantly 
contributed to explaining the German corporate default rate. In addition, the industrial production 
variable contributed as a cyclical indicator to the explanation of the default rate.
37 Unlike all the 
other macroeconomic variables considered in this study, the latter indicator has the specific 
characteristic of being forward looking. However, it turned out that this variable resulted in 
autocorrelation, so it was not considered for the final specification.  
Also, the corporate credit-to-GDP ratio with a lag of four quarters was included in the final 
specification for Germany. This clearly indicates that the aggregated level of corporate 
indebtedness plays a crucial role in the prediction of corporate default rates.  
                                                           
33 We consider the growth of GDP compared to the same quarter in the prior year. 
34 Debt is defined as total outstanding bank loans to the non-financial corporate sector. 
35 Until 1999, we used one-month annual German interbank rates and afterwards we used one-month annual 
EURIBOR rates.  
36 The level of interest rates has a substantial effect on corporate credit financing, especially for credit with short-
term duration, constituting a substantial portion of newly granted credit particularly in the Czech Republic, but 
also in Germany. 
37 We used annual changes of the index value relative to the quarter in the year before. 16   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
When estimating both models, the latent factor was significant. This implies that the corporate 
default rate in the economy is affected by additional factors other than those included in the 
model. Nevertheless, the graphs below clearly show that the calibration based on a limited number 
of variables was relatively successful.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the performance of the estimated model for the Czech corporate sector. 
The figure clearly shows the decrease of the corporate NPL-based default rate from a very high 
level of around 20% at the end of the 1990s to a level of 10% from 2000 to 2002, before the NPL 
rate decreased to an intensity of 3% from 2004 on, the time pattern being captured by the model in 
a meaningful way. The decline in the historical high levels of the default rate was caused by 
privatisation of the banks and the subsequent improvement in their credit risk management 
methods. Most of the banks implemented rating models at the beginning of the new millennium. 
In addition, after the currency crisis in May 1997 and consecutive banking crisis they started 
lending in a very careful way. 
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Figure 2 shows the equivalent outcome of the model calibration for Germany. The NPL inflow 
rate for German corporates fluctuates around 2% until 2000, reaches a peak of around 3% in 2002 
and decreases again to the previous level and then further to 1.5% afterwards. As shown in the 
graph, the model is able to explain the increase in the default rate and the subsequent decrease. In 
addition, the model predicts some slight increases, particularly around the time of the Asian and 
Russian crises in 1998/1999, which, however, cannot be seen in the corporate default rate in 
Germany. 
                                                           
38 The default rate denotes the non-performing loan inflow rate. Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   17 
 






1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Observed Default Rate Estimated Default Rate
 
 
Due to the non-linearities of the models, the estimated β coefficients cannot be interpreted as the 
elasticity of the default rates with respect to the specific macroeconomic indicator change. In 
order to capture the sensitivity of the default rates, we can calculate mean elasticities that 
represent the effect of changes of macroeconomic indicators (xi) on the aggregated default rate 
(df). In a general way, the formula for the elasticities can be expressed by the following equation 




































































Table 5 shows the elasticities of the macroeconomic indicators (xi) at their mean values. The signs 
of the elasticities are all in line with the signs of the coefficients (βi). The default rate for the 
Czech economy is much more sensitive to changes in GDP than in the German case. Furthermore, 
contrary to Germany, the corporate default rate in the Czech economy is very sensitive to 
exchange rate changes. 
Table 5: Mean Elasticities for the Included Variables for the Czech and German Corporate 
Models 
Czech Republic 
Variables  gdp  e  π  Debt 
Elasticities  -0.29  1.80  -0.28  1.58 
Germany 
Variables  gdp  indprod  ir  Debt 
Elasticities  -0.14  -0.03 0.28  1.7 
 18   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
The robustness of the specifications was ensured by means of three tests: first, a likelihood test 
(chi-square test); second, a test of autocorrelation in the residuals; third, a test of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. All these tests were also a means of verifying the assumptions 
made. Accordingly, it was found that the corporate models are relatively robust for both countries. 
More specifically, the likelihood test was performed to evaluate the quality of the model. For both 
countries, the test rejected the null hypothesis at a confidence level of less than 1%. In addition, 
the non-linearity of the model was taken into account by investigating the pseudo-coefficients 
suggested by Estrella (1998), Cragg-Uhler (1970) and Veall-Zimmermann (1992), yielding values 
of close to one and thus supporting the quality of the model. The test of autocorrelation of the 
model was done by using the Q-statistics. Autocorrelation in the residuals is absent at the 5% 
confidence level. Moreover, potential heteroscedasticity was investigated by means of the 
Breusch-Pagan test. For both countries, the presence of heteroscedasticity was not indicated, 
implying that both models can be assumed to be unbiased.  
In the last step, we investigated whether this kind of model remains reliable for periods that were 
not used for the calibration, i.e. in an out-of-sample context. This was done by using data until 
2004 to calibrate the models and more recent data to test the forecasting ability of the models. 
More precisely, the corporate credit risk model was calibrated for the period 1998 Q3 to 2004 Q4 
in the case of the Czech economy and the period 1994 Q1 to 2004 Q4 in the German case. Then 
we generated forecasts for the period 2004 Q1 to 2006 Q4 for both models and calculated the 
forecast bias, standard forecast error and mean square forecast error. Next, these evaluation 
statistics were compared with a random walk model. The outcome shows that the models also 
perform relatively well in an out-of-sample context, as shown in Table 6 and Figure 6 in the 
Appendix. The better performance of the random walk model in the Czech case was driven by the 
low volatility of the corporate default rate in the period considered (2004–2006).  
Table 6: Out-of-Sample Tests for the Corporate Sector 
Czech case  German case  2004 1Q – 2006 4Q 
Forecast  Random walk  Forecast  Random walk 
Forecast bias  0.000439  0.000441 0.000033 0.000986 
Standard forecast error  0.003441 0.002113  0.000588 0.000298 
Mean square forecast error  0.000012 0.000005  0.000000 0.000001 
 
6. A Credit Risk Model for the Household Sector  
For the analysis of credit risk for households, we refer to the same aggregate top-down model as 
in the case of corporates. 
Overall, there are at least three different economic factors that are particularly relevant for the 
prediction and explanation of household default rates, namely household income (1), the level of 
indebtedness (2) and the macroeconomic environment in a broader sense (3). 
In general, a financial crisis for households usually occurs as follows: if disposable household 
income falls below a certain threshold, households have to sell their assets. If there are no assets 
left to be sold, a default event occurs.  Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   19 
 
From the set of variables considered for households (see the data section), two macroeconomic 
variables were included in the models for the Czech Republic and for Germany. However, the 
variables included were from different domains: while those in the Czech case are both “purely” 
macroeconomic variables (i.e. from the third domain), those in the German case refer to 
household income and level of indebtedness as shown in Table 7.  
For the Czech model calibrated for the time period from 1997 Q3 to 2006 Q3
39, it was found that 
both the unemployment rate (u) and the real interest rate (r) have a positive effect on household 
default rates. For Germany (1994 Q1 – 2006 Q4), the two most significant variables were 
household income (inc) and the household debt to GDP ratio (debthouse) with, respectively, a 
negative and positive effect on the private default rate.  
Table 7: Macroeconomic Credit Risk Model for Czech and German Households 
Variable Notation  Czech  case  German  case 
   Lag  Coefficient  Std. 
error 
Lag Coefficient  Std. 
error 
Constant     -2.224***  0.071    -5.5656***  0.1072 
Household Income 
(β1) 
inc   ---  ---  0  -5.7912***  0.9244 
Credit-to-GDP 
Ratio (β2) 
debthouse   ---  ---  -4  5.7186***  0.2788 
Unemployment 
Rate (β3,1) 
u  -4 3.695*** 0.846 ---  ---  --- 
Real Interest Rate 
(β3,2) 
r  -3 1.808** 0.596  ---  ---  --- 
Note: Significance level: **: Significant at 5% level; ***: Significant at 1% level.  
 
The most important macroeconomic driver for household default is the unemployment rate, as it 
significantly affects households’ income. If the key breadwinner of a heavily indebted household 
loses his/her job, for example, the household is not usually able to compensate for this deficit, so 
default becomes highly likely. In the Czech case, the unemployment rate was found to be relevant 
with a lag of four quarters, which corresponds to the lagged impact on payment discipline in the 
event of loss of employment.
40 In the case of the real interest rate, the statistically best results 
were achieved for a lag of three quarters – apparently the duration of an altered interest rate fixing 
on household defaults. The real interest rate was calculated by deflating the annual PRIBOR by 
annual changes in the CPI. The relevance of real interest rates is highly driven by the fact that a 
substantial portion of household debt is based on floating interest rates. In addition, the use of this 
variable allows the impacts of interest rates and inflation to be captured simultaneously. It is 
worth noting that the National Bank of Denmark uses the same variables as found for the Czech 
Republic (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2007). The other variables considered, such as nominal 
                                                           
39 The quarterly time series of the annual default rate was generated from the monthly series of the annual default 
rate calculated using relationship (2) by averaging the three monthly figures corresponding to the relevant 
quarter. Although the default rate obtained using equation (2) was available from 1994, the time series on which 
the model was estimated had to be shortened as a result of some lags in the model and due to the shorter series of 
the other macroeconomic indicators included in the model. 
40 The loan is initially repaid from savings or the redundancy payment; payment discipline is affected only after 
that. 20   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
interest rates, inflation, the interest rate gap, the real GDP growth rate, the output gap and the ratio 
of interest paid to income or disposable income, were not significant. 
The development of the Czech household default rate is shown graphically below. It exhibits a 
much less volatile time pattern than the corporate default rate for the country. 
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For Germany as well, the calibration of the model turned out to be less straightforward than for 
the corporate case. In the German case, the credit-to-GDP ratio, i.e. the aggregate level of 
household debt relative to GDP, had by far the strongest effect on the household default rate, 
being the only ratio that reflects the immense and continuous increase in the household default 
rate in Germany during the last ten years. It is important to highlight at this point that an official 
household default code has existed only since 1999, and that its existence has become known only 
fairly recently, so the increase in the default rate may be partially driven by more and more people 
becoming aware of this opportunity. Hence, the results for the German household sector have to 
be interpreted with caution.  
Moreover, the decent economic development in Germany during the last decade was also partially 
reflected in household income. Household income constitutes the primary source of financing of 
credit, so it plays a crucial role in household default.
41  
The other structural economic indicators that were considered, for example the savings rate and 





                                                           
41 More specifically, the income to instalment ratio is relevant, given that this ratio is usually relatively stable 
over time, as households typically have a regular income in the form of a salary or pension. In addition, 
households often possess financial assets, for example real estate or personal assets, which can be liquidated in 
the case of a financial shortcoming. Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   21 
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To sum up, the outcome for both countries reveals that the aggregate household models were less 
successful in explaining household default compared to the corporate case, and there were 
apparently less similarities across countries. An important reason could be that there were 
apparently developments beyond the economic sphere explaining the evolution of the household 
default rate, these being of a socio-economic nature. In the German case, for example, there was, 
similar to other western European countries, a tendency toward a decline in the welfare of many 
private households, particularly in the case of unemployment, notably also due to a reduction of 
social contributions. Combined with a change in family structures, namely an increasing divorce 
rate, this led to an increasing level of single-person households and migration into larger cities, 
where rents were increasing, etc. 
Subsequently, mean elasticities were calculated for both models as previously done for the 
corporate sector. This indicator is supposed to reveal the sensitivity of default rates to 
macroeconomic variables. We found very low elasticities of the Czech household default rate 
particularly with respect to real interest rates. In the German case, the elasticities were much 
higher. Nevertheless, further tests outlined below point to a possible bias of the estimates of the 
German model and a poor performance of the models for households overall. 
Table 8: Mean Elasticities for the Considered Variables for the Czech and German Household 
Models 
Czech case 
Variables  u  r 
Elasticities  0.12  0.01 
German case 
Variables  inc  debt 
Elasticities  -0.23  8.13 
 
The previous considerations were further investigated by means of robustness tests. The outcome 
of these tests shows that the household models were less robust, which has to be taken into 
account when it comes to stress testing. More specifically, the absence of autocorrelation can be 
confirmed for the Czech case at the 5% significance level, while this is not possible for the 22   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
German case. In the latter case, this means that the model may be biased and that the dependent 
variable may not be properly explained by the considered macroeconomic indicators only. In 
addition, a test for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals shows that the estimated 
standard errors of the coefficients may be biased. 
7. Stress Testing  
Next, the credit risk models are used for stress testing, which is important both as a tool to ensure 
financial stability and for Basel II purposes on a micro level. This has also become evident in 
terms of the US subprime crisis. Its effects are likely to remain a threat to financial stability, 
although the countries considered in this study, especially Germany, seem to have been affected 
only moderately through banks’ investments in US real estate securities (with the exception of 
specific financial institutions). The major effect resulting from the crisis may be a worsening 
worldwide economic environment due to a potential recession in the United States. Stress testing 
allows simulation of various scenarios to help banks and regulators identify and prevent potential 
risks.  
The key challenge for stress testing is the choice of scenarios. Ideally, a stress testing exercise 
begins with an assumed adverse macroeconomic event that is then endogenously translated into a 
credit risk scenario in terms of different risk factors. However, such comprehensive and complex 
risk modelling frameworks hardly exist in banks, so banks (and regulatory bodies) are likely to 
apply other methods, namely regression analysis, historical simulation and sensitivity analysis.
42 
For the purpose of stress testing the financial system as a whole, so-called macro stress testing, we 
will refer to historical simulation type stress testing, as we use adverse events during the observed 
period to predict stress scenarios in the future, as further elaborated below.  
In the next step, the outcome of our macro stress tests is used for Basel II-type stress testing at the 
firm level, which we will refer to as micro stress testing. The stress test type applied in the case of 
the IRB approach is sensitivity analysis and historical simulation of the IRB credit parameters 
rather than a single risk factor which has been pre-calibrated in terms of stress. 
7.1 Macro Stress Tests for Czech and German Corporates  
For both the corporate and household sector, we deal with the challenge of selecting appropriate 
scenarios. We will use both historic simulation-based scenarios and expert judgment-based 
scenarios to arrive at appropriate macro stress tests.
43  
In the underlying case with a stress test forecast period of one year, some of the variables would 
not have to be forecasted due to their lag of up to four quarters. However, this is not the usual 
case, particularly if one seeks to arrive at a longer prediction horizon. In that case, forecast models 
                                                           
42 For an overview of the stress tests applied by German banks see Bundesbank (2004).  
43 In the latter case, one could use the macroeconomic forecast of the relevant central banks, for example, in the 
Czech case the CNB’s quarterly macroeconomic forecast (CNB, 2003) and in the German case the 
macroeconomic forecast of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the European Central Bank, and then add some 
additional stress at one’s discretion. Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   23 
 
such as panel regression models or the vector error correction model (VEC) can be used either to 
directly model credit growth, for example, or to estimate it through macroeconomic variables.
44  
For all four models, we simulate a stress test based on end-2006 data (2006 Q4) for the end-2007 
situation. Accordingly, an inflation rate of 2.9%, a real effective exchange rate of 1.046, a real 
GDP growth rate of 5.81% and a corporate credit-to-GDP ratio of 17.69% yield a model-inferred 
default rate of 3.5% for Czech corporates at the end of 2006, very close to the actual value.  
Next, we define two quantile-based stress scenarios of a moderate and more severe intensity, 
which are used for all four models and thus allow for meaningful comparisons. We assume that 
the quantiles of all macroeconomic variables change by 10 percentage points (moderate stress 
scenario, HS 10%) and 20 percentage points (severe stress scenario, HS 20%), respectively, in 
the unfavourable direction. In two cases where the highest historical levels applied, we did not 
apply full adjustment of the parameter (i.e. a 10% and 20% increase or decrease), but used the 
100% quantile value for the HS 10% scenario and rounded the parameter up for the HS 20% 
scenario. Descriptive statistics of the historical values for all variables included in the Czech 
corporate model are shown in Table 1. In the moderate stress scenario (HS 10%), for example, the 
real effective exchange rate remains at 1.046 given that this is the maximum observed historical 
value, inflation decreases to 2.5%, GDP growth decreases to 4.27% and the credit-to-GDP ratio 
increases to 19.67%. In addition, we add an expert-based scenario which takes into account the 
recent development of the variables. The stress parameter values used for the three scenarios are 
displayed below. 
Table 9: Macro Stress Tests Applied to Czech Corporates 






















(33.3)  3.5%   --- 
HS 10% 
scenario 1.046
45 2.50% 4.27%  19.67%  5.5% +57% 
HS 20% 
scenario 1.1
46 2.30%  3.88%  28.46% 10.6% +204%
47 
Expert-based 1.1  2.50%  4.00%  23.00%  8% +128% 
Note: HS 10% (20%) represents a moderate (severe) stress test scenario in which the quantiles of all 
macroeconomic variables change by 10 (20) percentage points in the unfavourable direction. 
 
 
                                                           
44 Alternatively, the most important parameter used in this study – (sector-specific) credit growth – can be 
forecasted by means of panel regression models (for the CEECs see Cottarelli et al., 2003, and Duenwald et al., 
2005). Besides, VEC models have been used to arrive at forecasts for single countries as well as for aggregate 
data for several countries, for example by Hofmann (2001) and Schadler et al. (2005).  
45 This value was used because the quantile value for the current scenario is already at 100%.  
46 For the 20% scenario, we assumed that the level of the real effective exchange rate would increase to 1.1, 
taking into account the very high level of the variable, and so we did not stick strictly to the quantile rule.  
47 If the quantile rule had been strictly applied, the default rate would have been 11.6% and the respective 
increase 233%. 24   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
As shown in Table 9, the Czech corporate default rates increase substantially for all three stress 
scenarios, by 57% in the HS 10% case (to 5.5%), by 128% in the expert-based scenario and by 
204% in the HS 20% scenario. For the historical quantile-based scenarios, it is particularly the 
credit-to-GDP ratio that accounts for a very high increase in the default rate. Given that the level 
of this variable has constantly been below 20% since the second quarter of 2003, the 
corresponding historical-based value of the HS 20% scenario (28.46%) seems to be relatively 
high, so the expert-based value was chosen in a less conservative way. While the HS 20% 
scenario may be regarded as a rather unlikely severe scenario, it shows the volatility of the 
corporate default rate for Czech corporates in an illustrative way.  
The outcome of the corresponding stress tests for Germany is shown below.  


























(9.6)  1.4% --- 
HS 10% 
scenario 3.83%  3.34%  2.96%  54.18%  1.6% +13% 
HS 20% 
scenario 4.25%  2.59%  2.05%  54.46%  1.9% +29% 
Expert-based 4.50%  2.00%  3.00%  55.00%  2.0% +38% 
Note: HS 10% (20%) represents a moderate (severe) stress test scenario in which the quantiles of all 
macroeconomic variables change by 10 (20) percentage points. 
 
As the table shows clearly, the impact of the scenarios on the default rate of German corporates is 
much lower than in the Czech case, the increase remaining below 30% for the historical scenarios 
(even for the HS 20% scenario), while the expert-based scenario, which was chosen in a slightly 
more conservative way (especially in the case of GDP growth), yields an increase of 38%.  
The outcome that the multivariate impact of the stress test is much more severe for the Czech 
Republic can also be seen in the resulting stress values of each of the macroeconomic variables of 
the two corporate models: in the German case, they do not diverge too far from the actual value 
when stressed by 10% or 20%, while the stress level in the Czech case results in more substantial 
differences. Nevertheless, the full range of the historical values for Germany does also show that a 
more severe stress event could potentially yield a more substantial increase in the corporate 
default rate. If one applies a stress level of 30% (HS 30%) and 40% (HS 40%) to further 
investigate whether the stress effect tends to be non-linear, the resulting increase in the default 
rate by 44% and 66% respectively shows that the impact remains relatively moderate compared to 
the Czech case, so this is not the case. 
7.2 Macro Stress Tests for Czech and German Households 
For the stress tests of the household sector, one first has to take into account that the performance 
of the model was considerably weaker than for the corporate sector, so the stress testing exercise 
will be less precise and one is more likely to over- or under-estimate the effect of a stress event. 
Taking a conservative stance, one may add some cushion to the actual outcome in both directions. 
Hence, we will only apply the same historical, quantile-based scenarios for households without Stress Testing Credit Risk: Is the Czech Republic Different from Germany?   25 
 
additionally using an expert-based scenario, also in order not to stretch the use of household 
models too much.  
The outcome of the stress tests applied to Czech households is displayed below. The result of an 
increase in the default rate of only 4% for the HS 10% scenario and 6% for the HS 20% scenario 
suggests a relatively low sensitivity of the household default rate to changes in the economic 
variables. As pointed out before, not all effects shown in the empirical default rates are fully 
captured in the model, so the result has to be interpreted with care.  








Relative to 2006 
Q4 





(0.0)  2.59% --- 
HS 10% 
scenario 8.02%  0.01%  2.69% +4% 
HS 20% 
scenario 8.19%  0.15%  2.75% +6% 
Note: HS 10% (20%) represents a moderate (severe) stress test scenario in which the quantiles of all 
macroeconomic variables change by 10 (20) percentage points. 
 
The outcome of the macro stress test for German households is displayed below. The increase in 
the default rate is higher than for the Czech case, with 11% for the HS 10% scenario and 28%
48 
for the HS 20% scenario. It is worth noting that the size of the default-rate increase for the two 
stress scenarios is very similar to the case for German corporates. While this outcome may be 
striking at first glance, it again reflects the continuous and rapid increase in German household 
default rates in recent years. Again, one should take into account that the model specification is 
less robust than for the corporate case.  








Relative to 2006 
Q4 





(98.3)  0.115% --- 
HS 10% 
scenario 0.62%  45.20%
49  0.128% +11% 
HS 20% 
scenario 0.15%  45.50%
50  0.148% +28% 
Note: HS 10% (20%) represents a moderate (severe) stress test scenario in which the quantiles of all 
macroeconomic variables change by 10 (20) percentage points. 
 
                                                           
48 If the 100% quantile had been applied to the credit-to-GDP ratio (45.20% as for the HS 10% scenario), the 
default rate would have increased by only 21%. 
49 Given that the quantile value for the current scenario is already 98.3%, we applied the 100% quantile. 
50 In the same way as for Czech corporates, a higher value was applied in the 20% scenario than foreseen by the 
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7.3 Stress Test Applied to a Hypothetical Bank Portfolio  
In the Basel II framework (BCBS, 2006), stress testing is part of Pillar I and Pillar II, where banks 
are asked, in a broader sense, to analyse possible future scenarios that may threaten their solvency. 
In the case of credit risk, this includes in particular an assessment of economic or industry sector-
specific downturn events, which must be chosen in a “meaningful” and “reasonably conservative” 
way and thus represent at least “mild recession scenarios”, but not necessarily a “worst-case 
scenario” (BCBS, 2006, para. 435). In order to keep the stress tests flexible and thus match the 
specific requirements of each bank, the challenging task of choosing stress scenarios is at the 
discretion of banks and has to be justified to the supervisory body.  
Within the Basel II framework, a stress test on credit risk would comprise all IRB credit risk 
parameters, namely the Probability of Default (PD) (those of both borrowers and guarantors), the 
Loss Given Default (LGD) and the Exposure at Default (EAD).
51 If a bank applying either the 
Foundation IRB (FIRB)
52 or the Advanced IRB (AIRB) approach additionally uses an economic 
capital model, then stress testing would typically additionally comprise an assessment of credit 
correlations and portfolio industry sector concentration or geographic concentrations.
53  
Next, we use the outcome of the macro stress testing exercise in a top-down manner for Basel II-
type micro stress testing based on a hypothetical credit portfolio.
54 The portfolio comprises 6,000 
loans, with 50% of the credit exposure being granted to corporates and 50% to households. This 
decomposes into 462 loans made to corporates and 5,538 to households, with a relative exposure 
size of corporate exposures to retail (household) exposures of 12:1.
55 
In terms of the credit portfolio risk measure, we refer to the Basel II minimum capital 
requirements under the IRB approach. In this way, the regulatory capital requirements – in their 
role as a Value-at-Risk ratio for a one-year horizon and a confidence level of 99.9% – are used as 
an indicator of the inherent credit risk in the portfolio.
56 For corporate loans, we apply the Basel II 
                                                           
51 In addition, the Maturity (M) could also be subject to stress testing.  
52 IRB stands for internal ratings-based approach.  
53 Basel II-type microeconomic stress testing is also applied in supervisory bodies. In the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
for example, Basel II-type microeconomic stress tests are carried out in two different forms: first, in terms of 
sensitivity analysis to simulate macroeconomic effects on specific credit risk parameters, carried out in the 
framework of the Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS); and second, in terms of scenario analysis, based on a 
stochastic multi-factor model using data from the German credit register, for example to arrive at further insights 
into sectoral concentrations. For further information see Deutsche Bundesbank (2007, p. 102f.).  
54 We sought to make the portfolio as realistic as possible. This was supported by expert judgment in various 
dimensions, so that the values are meaningful for both countries. It is important to highlight that a real portfolio 
would be non-homogeneous in terms of PD and EAD (but also in terms of LGD and, if the data allow for that, in 
credit correlations), which would alter the results. The direction of the changes depends on the actual portfolio, 
namely whether it contains mostly SMEs with similar risk characteristics or a mixture of large, medium-sized 
and small corporates, the industry-sector distribution, etc.  
55 This size ratio was revealed as follows. We calculated the average corporate credit by dividing the total 
corporate credit volume in Germany by the number of corporate firms in 2007 and then assumed that the firms’ 
credit is spread equally over two banks. For the household sector, we similarly took the total household credit 
volume in Germany and divided it by the number of German households. The resulting absolute numbers were 
209,000 EUR for the corporate sector and 17,000 EUR for the household sector. In terms of size ratio, we thus 
assume that 12/13 (n=5538.5) of the loans are granted to households and 1/13 (n=461.5) to corporates. See 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2007), p. 54/55. 
56 Further information on Basel II can be found in BCBS (2006) and the relevant national regulations, in the 
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IRB formula for corporates (BCBS, 2006, para. 272) based on four inputs, namely PD, LGD, 
EAD and Maturity (M). For loans to households, the formula for other retail exposure (BCBS, 
2006, para. 330) is applied, so the maturity is not needed.  
In order to allow for a meaningful comparison between the two countries, we use the two 
historical, quantile-based macroeconomic stress scenarios elaborated in the last section (HS 10%, 
HS 20%) as the basis for portfolio stress testing (i.e. for a stress on the PD) and measure the 
relative effect for the two countries for the same credit portfolio. We need to take into account that 
these scenarios are not fully comparable, as their calibration may be driven by the transformation 
period in the Czech case, since the volatility of the relevant time series is considerable higher than 
for Germany. Furthermore, we stress slightly different macroeconomic variables in each case, as 
the credit risk models are country specific. 
We further assume that the portfolio is homogeneous in terms of PDs and exposures within the 
corporate and household sectors respectively. In the first case (1), the LGD is fixed at 45% and 
the maturity at 2.5 years as foreseen under the Foundation IRB approach for senior unsecured 
debt.
57 Second (2), the LGD will be increased by 20% in relative terms (from 45% to 54%) in 
order to take into account a potential positive correlation between the PD and the LGD. 
The resulting Herfindahl-Hirshmann-Index (HHI) of 0.00059 indicates that the credit portfolio 
referred to is granular in terms of EAD
58, implying that there is only minor name concentration. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the corporate portfolio is also diversified across industries and 
geographical sectors, so the basic assumptions for the use of the Basel II one-factor model are 
fulfilled. While these assumptions facilitate the use of the Basel II IRB model, the resulting credit 
risk requirements thus tend to be a lower bound for the actual portfolio credit risk.  
The regulatory IRB capital requirements for this hypothetical credit portfolio are displayed in the 
table below, listing the outcome for the two stress tests without and with LGD stress for the two 
countries.
59 The capital requirements are measured relative to the portfolio exposure and are 
highlighted in bold. 
The table shows various results. First, the unstressed minimum capital requirements are 7.82% of 
the exposure in the Czech case, compared to 4.66% in the German case, implying that the 
portfolio credit risk in the Czech Republic exceeds the portfolio credit risk in Germany by a 
considerable 68% due to higher default rates.
60 Second, the table also shows that the impact of a 
univariate macroeconomic stress on default probabilities (when keeping recovery rates at the same 
level, i.e. case 1) is much higher for the Czech portfolio, yielding an increase in the capital 
requirements of 10.7% compared to 4.5% for Germany in the case of stress scenario HS 10% and 
32.6% versus 9.2% for the more severe stress scenario HS 20% (case 2). This outcome shows that 
                                                           
57 In some jurisdictions, the effective maturity is used in the same way as in the case of the AIRB and is thus not 
fixed at 2.5 years.  
58 In the study of Gordy and Lütkebohmert (2007), an average HHI of 0.001 was determined for credit portfolios 
of large German banks based on data from the German credit register.  
59 It is worth noting that we assume that the same levels of stress (i.e. HS 10% and HS 20%) occur 
simultaneously for households and corporates in each case.  
60 Although we focus on the relative impact of the stress tests, it is worth noting that the ratio is below the loaded 
8% level in both cases, reflecting the fact that the portfolio quality is above average overall based on the end-
2006 parameters.  28   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
the impact of a macroeconomic stress event for default rates translates into a 2.4 times (HS 10%) 
and 3.5 times (HS 20%) higher impact on capital requirements in the Czech case, driven mostly 
by the higher volatility of default rates in the corporate sector. 
Table 13: Impact of Macro Stress Tests on IRB Minimum Capital Requirements (CR) for a 
Hypothetical Portfolio: Comparison for the Czech Republic and Germany (CR are 
measured in % of exposure) 





PD stress only 
(case 1) 
PD and LGD 
stress 
(case 2) 
Corporate-PD (%)  3.50  5.5 
Household-PD (%)  2.59  2.69 





Requirements (%)  7.82  8.66 (+10.7%)  10.39 (+32.9%) 
Corporate-PD (%)  3.50  10.60 
Household-PD (%)  2.59  2.75 










Requirements (%)  7.82  10.37 (32.6%)  12.45 (59.2%) 
Corporate-PD (%)  1.43  1.63 
Household-PD (%)  0.115  0.128 





Requirements (%)  4.66  4.87 (+4.5%)  5.84 (25.3%) 
Corporate-PD (%)  1.43  1.85 
Household-PD (%)  0.115  0.148 









Requirements (%)  4.66  5.09 (+9.2%)  6.11 (31.1%) 
 
Third, if one adds a potential stress level of the LGD of 20%
61 in order to arrive at a more 
comprehensive impact of the capital requirements for the credit portfolio (case 2), then the 
increase in the capital requirements is around 33% (HS 10%) and 59% (HS 20%) for the two 
stress cases on the Czech portfolio and 25% and 31% for the German portfolio. In a study based 
on a large European corporate credit portfolio for a similar time period, Düllmann et al. (2008) 
find a maximum increase in the IRB minimum capital requirements of 34% on an annual basis, 
which is in the same range as for the German case. However, for an economic capital model 
additionally taking into account the variation of credit correlations, the authors find that the 
economic capital increase may be more than twice as high as for the IRB capital. If this was 
translated into the outcome of the current study, then a credit portfolio in the Czech Republic may 
be exposed to an increase in (economic) capital requirements of more than 100%, despite the 
“smoothing” effect of Czech households.  
To sum up, macro stress scenarios translated into micro stress tests may lead to a considerable 
increase in capital requirements even for a homogeneous and well-diversified portfolio that 
                                                           
61 From a methodological perspective, an increase in the LGD has a linear effect on the Basel II capital 
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reflects the average macroeconomic conditions of the economy as in the underlying case. Hence, 
the effect can be assumed to multiply for a concentrated, heterogeneous portfolio with a higher 
ratio of corporate credit as in the underlying case, so that the increase in default rates and recovery 
rates are higher than for the average bank portfolio.  
8. Conclusion 
In this study, macroeconomic credit risk modelling for the corporate sector and the household 
sector was applied to both the Czech and the German economies. In the first step, reliable and 
comparable data were generated, yielding a time frame of eight years from 1998 to 2006 for the 
Czech Republic and 12 years from 1994 to 2006 for Germany based on annualised quarterly data. 
Furthermore, it was ensured throughout the study that the results for the two countries were 
comparable in order to work out and explain potential differences. 
Next, a Merton-type one-factor credit risk model was used to estimate aggregate corporate and 
household default rates based on non-performing loans. We found that modelling was meaningful 
for the corporate sector, while this was not entirely the case for the household sector. Moreover, 
the outcome that similar variables can explain the default rates for two economies with a different 
default rate and volatility pattern suggests that corporate credit risk can obviously be explained by 
a limited set of similar variables for different economies. By contrast, further research seems to be 
necessary in order to better explain the time pattern of household default rates. The use of bottom-
up models as applied by some regulatory bodies is promising provided that data are available.  
Subsequently, macro stress testing was applied, indicating that there can be a substantial increase 
in the corporate default rate (more than 100% for the Czech Republic; up to 40% for Germany). 
However, the sensitivity of the corporate sector default rates for the Czech Republic was driven 
by the high volatility of the macroeconomic indicators during the transition period of the late 
1990s, so the results have to be interpreted carefully. Due to this fact, as well as to the different 
explanatory variables which were employed in the country-specific credit risk models, the results 
are not fully comparable. For households, sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment is less 
pronounced, unlike what the recent US subprime crisis might suggest. This outcome, which also 
holds true for the credit portfolio level, has to be interpreted with caution, as the robustness of the 
household model is substantially lower than that for the corporate sector, but it might also be seen 
as an indication that both economies are more robust to shocks in the household sector. The latter 
assumption seems to be reflected in the fact that the financial crisis has not had a considerable 
effect on the Czech and German household sectors.  
In the third step, the outcome of macro stress testing was used for top-down Basel II-type micro 
stress testing of the same hypothetical credit loan portfolio for both countries. It turned out that 
the increase in portfolio risk induced by a macroeconomic shock is more than twice as high for 
the Czech Republic as for Germany. Based on the regulatory IRB capital requirements, the 
portfolio credit risk of an average bank would increase by up to 60% in the Czech case and by 
roughly 30% for Germany. However, we need to take into account the above-mentioned 
limitations of our analysis (mainly the transition period in the Czech case), which do not allow a 
full comparison of the two countries. Nevertheless, our analysis indicated that a small, open, 
export-oriented economy is probably more sensitive to adverse macroeconomic shocks. 
Moreover, in the case of portfolios concentrated in names or sectors and/or when using an 30   Petr Jakubík and Christian Schmieder  
 
economic capital model that additionally takes into account potential variations of credit 
correlations, the increase in capital requirements could be much higher. 
To sum up, it has been clearly shown how important a comprehensive analysis of credit risk is in 
order for regulatory bodies to be able to take measures to safeguard financial stability. Besides the 
numerical results of this study for the two underlying countries, we provided a template for 
investigating the credit risk environment of an economy. In this way, the underlying study can 
serve as a starting point for other countries to monitor credit risk in their financial systems and 
thus contribute to the detection of potential fragility of the banking sector as a means of 
preventing financial crises. Given that central banks and supervisory bodies usually have data on 
the credit portfolios of domestic banks (for example via a credit register), macroeconomic stress 
scenarios can be readily translated in a top-down manner for micro stress testing, in particular for 
those banks that are relevant from a systemic perspective. For the industry, the framework 
elaborated may contribute to the introduction of Basel II-type micro stress testing.  
In any case, future research is needed on the highly complex issues discussed in this paper. There 
are various approaches by different regulatory bodies pointing in the same direction from a 
methodological viewpoint. However, the most fundamental issue is to ensure reliable databases 
with a long-term horizon, which are not available in most countries. Improvements are also 
needed particularly for the household sector, where the modelling turned out to go beyond the 
economic dimension. 
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Appendix 
Figure 5: Analysis of Coefficient Stability for the Czech Corporate Credit Risk Model 














































































Figure 6: Out-of-sample Test for the Czech and German Corporate Credit Risk Model 
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